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Introduction
Since 1844, Rochdale pioneers'idea of cooperation has spread around the world and today more than 700 million cooperators are active through 100 countries (ICA 2006) . Among the various cooperative forms of enterprises, consumer cooperatives (henceforth Coops) are typically …rms that operate in retail industries pursuing the institutional objective to act on behalf of their consumer-members. 1 Nowadays these organizations represent one of the most successful examples of democratic and participative forms of enterprises, able to compete against well established and large-size pro…t-maximizing companies. Formed through a discontinuous process of sequential waves (see Finch, Trombley & Rabas 1998, for a brief account of the US case) Coops are well established in several countries without in general possessing a dominant position in retail industries, with a few exceptions such as Switzerland, Finland and Japan. Given their operational large scale Coops usually operate oligopolistically in developed countries. The Cooperative Group in the UK is one of the world's best known consumer cooperative providing a variety of retail and …nancial services. Japan is also known to possess a very relevant consumer cooperative movement with over 23. ) has mainly focussed on the behaviour of these …rms under either perfect competition, monopoly or monopolistic competition. However, retail industries are characterized by large-scale companies in developed economies, therefore in most cases modern Coops strategically compete against traditional pro…t-maximizing …rms (henceforth PMFs), thus giving rise to a speci…c instance of mixed oligopoly. 2 To the best of our knowledge, there are no contributions speci…cally dealing with mixed oligopoly between Coops and PMFs with the exception of Kelsey and Milne (2008) and Goering (2008) . Kelsey and Milne (2008) study the e¤ects of the presence of consumershareholders on the …rm decision-making under both monopoly and oligopoly. They show the presence of consumers among the …rm's stakeholders may be a strategic advantage and 1 Consumer-members are usually entitled to elect their representatives who participate in assemblies and hire the (professional or non professional) managers running the …rm. In large Co-ops the assembly elects a board of directors that, on its behalf, controls managers. 2 The term mixed oligopoly is usually adopted to describe a market in which one or more publicly-owned …rms compete against PMFs oligopolistically. Publicly-owned …rms are assumed to maximize social welfare, i.e the sum of consumers and producers'surplus.(see, for a survey, Delbono and De Fraja 1990). Alternatively, one can conceive a publicly-owned …rm as …nanced directly by all consumers through income tax. As a result, the marginal-cost pricing only obtains in the special case in which the income of the median voter equals the average income (Corneo 1997). ultimately increase …rm's pro…t. In their model consumers have non zero mass, and therefore act strategically. In contrast to their model, in our setup …rms are either pure Coops or pure PMFs competing in a di¤erentiated oligopoly. Coops maximize the utility of a representative consumer, which is assumed atomistic, and therefore solely interested in his/her consumer surplus. We will further analyze the di¤erence between modelling atomistic and non atomistic consumers later on in the paper.
The other paper, by Goering (2008) , presents a homogeneous good duopoly between a PMF and a non-pro…t …rm assumed to maximize a parametrized combination of pro…t and consumers'surplus. In the paper, such objective function is assumed exogenously. 3 A wide number of related papers deal with labour-managed …rms à la Ward (1958) and Vanek (1970) In general, both labourmanaged …rms and farmer-cooperatives represented in these models are not assumed to act on behalf of consumers. In the typical labour-managed …rm of the literature, worker-members are assumed to maximize per-worker value added, which implies that labour-managed …rms set their output more restrictively than standard pro…t-maximizing …rms. On the other hand, agriculture cooperatives are generally modelled as …rms using the inputs received from their farmer-members to deliver …nal goods to consumers. This objective function implies that agriculture cooperatives possess an incentive to overproduce, since farmers do not internalize their production externality on the …nal market price. However, if agriculture cooperatives buy inputs on behalf of their members, strong similarities with consumer cooperatives arise, as in this case they compete with pro…t-maximizing …rms in selling inputs to farmers, who here act as consumers. Empirically the presence of agriculture cooperatives increases sales and reduces prices on input markets, breaking existing monopsonies (Hansmann, 1996) . Therefore, in this respect, some of the results of our paper may also be applied to agriculture cooperatives selling inputs to farmers.
Our paper models a Coop as a …rm maximizing the utility of a representative (atomistic) consumer that buys its good and receives a share of the …rm's net pro…t proportional to the ratio of her individual expenditure to the …rm's total sales. 4 As a result, every Coop is shown to set in equilibrium a price equal to its average production cost, thus a¤ecting the equilibrium behaviour of rival PMFs. All …rms are assumed to possess a constant-return-ofscale technology, and therefore in equilibrium every Coop sets a price equal to its constant marginal cost. The marginal cost pricing rule emerges endogenously in our model. This pricing rule makes our results comparable to those obtained in mixed oligopoly models with state-owned and PMFs (Cremèr, Marchand and Thisse 1989, De Fraja and Delbono 1989). The constant average cost assumption enables overcoming many of the issues related to Coops membership stability. 5 At the end of the paper we brie ‡y consider the e¤ects that may occur assuming increasing marginal costs.
The main purpose of our paper is to present a detailed taxonomy of the results obtained in an oligopoly in which an arbitrary number of PMFs and Coops compete strategically either in quantities or in prices and goods are di¤erentiated. We show that, under consumers' quasi-linear preferences, the presence of Coops in the market positively a¤ects both the total output and total welfare of the given industries (and market prices negatively). Under Cournot oligopoly and homogeneous goods it can be shown that the presence of Coops pushes all PMFs out of the market (or, alternatively, obliges them to behave as perfectly competitive …rms) thus maximizing social welfare. When goods are di¤erentiated, Coops e¤ect on welfare proves more signi…cant when goods are either complements or highly di¤erentiated and when competition is à la Cournot (in quantities) rather than à la Bertrand (in prices). Based on these results, we should expect consumer cooperatives to be more often present in markets possessing such features. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Sections 3 and 4 present the main results of mixed oligopoly with quantity and price competition and Section 5 o¤ers our concluding remarks.
The Model
2.1. Consumer Preferences. The demand side of the market is represented by a continuum of atomistic consumers i 2 I, whose mass is normalized to one, i.e. I = [0; 1]. Every consumer is assumed to possess preferences de…ned on (n + 1) commodities, n symmetrically di¤erentiated goods 6 x k (k = 1; :::; n) and a numeraire y, expressed by the following utility function U i : R If the available income of each i-th consumer (denoted y i ) is su¢ ciently high, every individual inverse demand can be obtained from the …rst-order conditions of the problem maximization (2.1) subject to budget constraint Sexton (1983) and Sexton & Sexton (1990) . In our paper all consumers buy Coops'goods and are therefore entitled to become members. This assumption is in line with the typical "open door" principle holding in cooperatives. Moreover, given the constant-return-of-scale technology, Coop e¢ ciency cannot be a¤ected by favouring the entry or the exit of members. 6 A good here may also be interpreted as a bundle of goods sold by every …rm in the market. 7 The Hessian of U i is negative semide…nite.for all (x
In (2.2) the price of good x k depends on the pro…le of quantities (x 1 ; :; x n ) (the market is a oligopoly) and not on every individual purchase x i k of the good.
2.2.
Industry. The retail industry consists of n …rms supplying n di¤erentiated goods (or bundles of goods), whose m are supplied by consumer cooperatives and (n m) by traditional pro…t-maximizing …rms. Let M N denote the set of all Coops and N nM the set of all PMFs. As usual, PMFs are assumed to maximize their pro…t
In general we will assume linear variable costs and zero …xed costs for all …rms. As anticipated, Coops act on behalf of atomistic consumers, and every consumer is assumed to receive a share of the Coop's net pro…t proportional to the amount of goods purchased over the Coop's total sales. This can be expressed by the following objective-function for a Coop
The problem (2.5) reduces to (2.6) max
and, the FOC for interior maximum of (2.6) for every j 2 M can be written as
as long as the price charged by a j-th Coop is su¢ ciently high to generate non negative pro…ts, namely, for p j (x 1 ; :
. Expression (2.7) indicates that a Coop acting on behalf of atomistic consumers sets its quantity to equate every consumer's willingness to pay for good j at its average cost, with the purpose to distribute the maximum consumer surplus to consumer-members (which here are all consumers).
Once (2.7) is respected for every single consumer, the Coop aggregates it for all consumers i 2 I, obtaining
Since all …rms possess a constant-return-of-scale technology, every Coop makes total consumers'willingness to pay for good j equal to marginal cost. 9 
Oligopoly with Quantity Competition
In order to study the implications of the simultaneous presence of both PMFs and Coops in an oligopolistic market, let the following utility function represent the preferences of a i-th consumer in the economy:
where > 0 and 2 [1=(1 n); 1] represents the degree of product di¤erentiation. For = 0, goods are independent and for = 1 goods are perfect substitutes. Moreover, for < 0 goods become complements.
Let also all …rms k = 1; 2; :::n possess identical strategy sets X k = [0; 1) and identical technology, expressed by a linear cost function, c k (x k ) = cx k with 0 < c < .
By (3.1) and (2.3), the following individual linear inverse demand for every good k = 1; 2; ::; n is obtained
Inverse market demand for one good can simply be obtained by integrating (3.2) over all consumers i 2 I. Moreover, the FOC of problem (2.6) yields the following FOC for every Coop producing the j-th good
Expression (3.3) is the FOC of a Coop acting on behalf of one atomistic consumer buying its product. A Coop will decide its own market quantity aggregating (3.3) for all consumers.
3.1. The Benchmark Case: Oligopoly with all PMFs. We can start illustrating the case in which all …rms are PMFs and the choice variables are quantities. Whereby …rms are PMFs they simply maximize their pro…ts with respect to the quantity of the k-th good, (3.4) k (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) = (
Solving this simple maximization problem yields the following best-replies for each k-th PMF,
where x k = (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x k 1 ; x k+1 ; ::; x n ), and therefore pure-PMF Nash equilibrium quantities (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) are easily obtained as
for k = 1; 2; ::; n and prices are given by
It is made evident by (3.5) that for = 1 the usual Cournot solution with homogenous goods (x k = ( c) = (n + 1)) occurs, while for = 0 goods are independent and all PMFs act monopolistically (x k = ( c) =2).
3.2.
Mixed Cournot Oligopoly. Let us now assume that a group of m …rms in the market (m n) turn into Coops accepting all consumers as their members. The market thus turns into a mixed oligopoly in which m Coops compete against (n m) traditional PMFs. By aggregating (3.3) for all consumers and di¤erentiating (3.4), the following best-replies are obtained, respectively,
Exploiting the symmetry of the m Coop and of the (n m) PMFs, the following mixed oligopoly Nash equilibrium quantities are obtained for every Coop (3.8)
and every PMF (3.9)
with corresponding equilibrium prices
for every Coop and
for every PMF, respectively.
It can be proved that, in general, if goods are perfect substitutes ( = 1) the model yields the extreme prediction that the presence of even just one Coop in the market pushes PMFs out of the market. 11 This could, alternatively, be interpreted as if the presence of Coops obliges all PMFs to adopt a perfectly competitive behaviour in order to stay in the market. Either way, as the equilibrium price coincides with all …rms' average and marginal costs, every consumer's willingness to pay for the homogeneous good is just equal to every …rm's marginal production cost thus implying welfare maximization (since u 0 = c). These results are condensed in the next proposition. As an additional observation, please note that the total market output under mixed oligopoly X = P k=1;::;n x k is equal to (3.10)
For m = 0 the above expression coincides with pure n-PMF oligopoly
and for m = n the expression turns into pure n-Coop total quantity, with
From (3.11) and (3.12) pure Coop oligopoly clearly yields higher output than pure PMF oligopoly. Moreover, expression (3.10) makes clear that under mixed oligopoly the total output increases monotonically with the number of active Coops in the market.
Proposition 1.
Under a mixed oligopoly in quantities and homogeneous goods ( = 1), the presence of even one single Coop in the market implies that all PMFs become inactive, the industry output is greater than that obtained with all PMFs and the economy social welfare is maximized.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Moreover, some simple results can be obtained for the range 2 [0; 1].
Proposition 2. Under a mixed oligopoly in quantities, for 2 [0; 1] Coop output is always greater than PMF output, namely, x j > x h for all j 2 M and h 2 N nM . Moreover, for
3.3. Welfare Analysis: PMFs vs. Mixed Oligopoly. The analysis of social welfare under mixed oligopoly with di¤erentiated goods requires careful calculation of the interacting e¤ects of Coops and PMFs simultaneous presence on consumer surplus and pro…ts in all markets. By the property of quasi-linear preferences, consumers'welfare can be measured with no approximation by using consumers'surplus which, in turn, corresponds to the value of consumers'utilities.
Under a pure PMF oligopoly, for all k-th goods produced, total welfare (T W k ) can be computed as the sum of consumers'surplus plus …rms'pro…ts,
Summing up the welfare generated in all n markets and using (3.1), the utility functions aggregated for all consumers, we obtain
which, by the symmetry of all …rms, can be written as
In a mixed oligopoly, total welfare generated in all market managed by a j-th Coop is given by the area under the demand in correspondence to the quantity for which p j (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x n ) = c j ,
which using (3.1), (3.14) can be simply expressed as
Finally, total welfare under mixed oligopoly can be expressed as X
Now, plugging (3.5), (3.8) and (3.9) into the above expressions, we obtain the following values for total welfare (see Appendix)
under pure PMF oligopoly
and mixed oligopoly with m Coops and (n m) PMFs, respectively. Expression (3.17) illustrates that social welfare in a mixed oligopoly accounts for the sum of welfare yielded in (n m) markets in which PMFs produce plus welfare yielded in m markets in which Coops are, in turn, active.
3.3.1. Welfare under Duopoly. For illustrative purposes we can focus on the case of mixed duopoly compared to a pure PMF and to a pure Coop duopoly, respectively. The presence of Coops can be relatively more bene…cial in some circumstances than in others and, in particular, for speci…c levels of product di¤erentiation. Using (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17) we obtain total welfare as
under pure PMF duopoly,
(1 + ) under pure Coop duopoly, and
under mixed duopoly, respectively. Figure 1 shows that in terms of total welfare a pure Coop duopoly (continuous line) outperforms both a pure PMF duopoly and a mixed duopoly for any degree of goods di¤erentiation which is obvious, considering that a pure Coop basically acts as a welfare maximizer.
[FIGURE 1 -APPROXIMATELY HERE]
As already proven in proposition 1, under mixed duopoly (dotted line) for = 1 (homogeneous goods), only the Coop remains in the market and welfare is, therefore, maximized. Moreover, it can be noticed that the relative e¢ ciency of mixed duopoly versus pure PMF duopoly (circled line) is higher when goods are either complement ( < 0) or highly di¤er-entiated. When goods become more and more homogeneous, the welfare loss determined in a pure PMF versus a mixed duopoly or a pure Coop duopoly decreases progressively, yet it never vanishes. Similarly, mixed oligopoly better and better approximates maximum social welfare for goods becoming increasingly substitute.
Welfare Comparison with More than Two Firms.
The results obtained above still hold with more than two …rms that compete à la Cournot. It can be proven that the entry of new Coops in the market is always bene…cial to social welfare. The positive e¤ect of Coops on welfare still holds true when the total number of …rms in the market increases. Figure 2 illustrates that the entry of new …rms, boosting competition, always exerts a favourable impact on market welfare. Consequently, if the new entrants are Coops, such impact is even stronger. Consumers should therefore exert pressure on respective Coops to set up new selling units, thus increasing competition and welfare.
[FIGURE 2 -APPROXIMATELY HERE]
However, a simple comparison shows that when goods are substitutes ( > 0), the welfare raised by a pure Coop oligopoly becomes less and less advantageous compared to a pure PMF oligopoly when both n and increase. When competition is high (which happens for high n and ) the di¤erent forms of market do not perform so di¤erently, and thus welfare is not so far. See next proposition.
Proposition 4.
When the total number of …rms in the market increases (higher n) and goods become increasingly substitute (higher ), the di¤erence between total welfare in pure Coop oligopoly and welfare in pure PMF oligopoly progressively decreases.
[FIGURE 3 -APPROXIMATELY HERE] Figure 3 shows that when the number of …rms increases and goods become increasingly substitutes, Coops become the relative welfare advantage yielded by Coops progressively shrinks. Therefore, if Coops aspire to match consumers' needs, we should see this type of …rms more frequently in highly monopolistic markets in which goods are either highly di¤erentiated or complements.
In the next section, we consider the case of price competition.
Price Competition
It can be interesting to compare the case of quantity competition to the case of price competition so as to verify whether di¤erences arise. An obvious di¤erence is that, when goods are perfectly homogeneous, Bertrand competition yields the extreme prediction that …rms set prices equal to marginal cost, regardless of the objective functions of …rms competing in the market.
4.1.
Oligopoly with all PMFs. When all …rms are PMFs, we …rst obtain the direct demand for each k-th good as price function,
) ((n 1) + 1) for k = 1; 2; ::; n and 6 = 1.
12
As a result, all PMFs'pro…t function can be written as
Di¤erentiating (4.1) with respect to p k yields the best-reply of every k-th PMF as
where p k = (p 1 ; p 2 ; ::; p k 1 ; p k+1 ; ::; p n ).
By symmetry, the Nash equilibrium price of every k-th PMF can be obtained as
with associated quantities:
3) x k (p 1 ; p 2 ; ::; p n ) = ( c) (1 + (n 2)) (1 + (n 1)) (2 + (n 3)) and pro…ts
4.2. Mixed Oligopoly with Price Competition. Again we assume that m n …rms start behaving as Coops. By (3.1) and (3.4), we obtain the following direct demands for a PMF h 2 N nM , given the price charged by other …rms,
(1 ) (1 + (n 1)) and the price charged by a Coop j 2 M x h (p 1 ; p 2 ; ::; p n ) = ( c) (1 + (n 2)) (1 + (n 1)) (2 + (n + m 3)) for every PMFs and (4.8)
x j (p 1 ; p 2 ; ::; p n ) = ( c) (2 + (2n 3)) (1 + (n 1)) (2 + (n + m 3)) ;
for every Coop, respectively.
Finally, every PMF's equilibrium pro…t is given by
Proposition 5. Under price competition and 2 [0; 1], mixed oligopoly prices are, for all …rms, either lower than or equal to pure PMF oligopoly prices, namely, p k p h p j for every j 2 M , h 2 N nM and k = 1; 2; ::n. Moreover,
Proof. See the Appendix 4.3. Welfare Comparison under Price Competition. For the sake of brevity, we concentrate in the Appendix all calculations of total welfare under price competition. We here report the results of such calculations, which are not too dissimilar from those obtained in the case of quantity competition. Total welfare under mixed oligopoly with an arbitrary number of PMFs and Coops competing in prices is obtained as
In the expression above we have again decomposed the total welfare in two distinct parts. Setting m = 0 in (4.9) we can obtain pure PMF oligopoly total welfare as
while, by setting n = m, we obtain pure Coop total welfare as
It can be noticed that pure Coop oligopoly always yields the optimum welfare, regardless of whether competition is either à la Cournot or à la Bertrand. Again, for illustrative purposes, we use the duopoly case to highlight the main di¤erences in welfare under price and quantity competition.
4.3.1. Welfare in Bertrand Duopoly. The expressions for the total welfare under Bertrand duopoly are the following:
By plotting the above expressions does not yield particular di¤erences versus the Cournot competition case, except in that all types of markets (pure PMF-duopoly included), yield the marginal cost pricing and then maximum welfare for = 1. Under Bertrand competition and homogeneous goods we observe perfect "isomorphism" in all …rms'behaviours.
[
FIGURE 4 -APPROXIMATELY HERE]
An important di¤erence between Bertrand and Cournot competition emerges in terms of welfare loss for a pure PMF oligopoly versus a pure Coop oligopoly. As shown in Figure 4 , the loss is de…nitively larger under quantity than under price competition and the di¤erence is particularly high when goods are reasonably homogeneous. This is the case in which the presence of at least one Coop in the market is de…nitively more bene…cial under Cournot than under Bertrand competition. Additional welfare comparisons between Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies are provided in the Appendix.
[FIGURE 5 -APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Concluding Remarks
Although consumer cooperatives are, in general, well established in several countries, their behaviour is still largely unknown and requires additional research, notably to identify the e¤ects of the strategic interaction between consumer cooperatives and traditional pro…t-maximizing …rms in oligopolistic markets. This paper has attempted to take a …rst step in this direction, showing the main e¤ects arising in a mixed oligopoly with pro…t-maximizing …rms and consumer cooperatives competing either à la Cournot or à la Bertrand in markets with heterogeneous goods. We have shown that the presence of Coops is particularly bene…cial for industries output and social welfare in mainly two cases. The …rst under Cournot competition and homogeneous goods when Coops behave so expansively to expel PMFs from the market, or, if interpreted di¤erently, to oblige them to behave as perfectly competitive …rms, setting a price equal to the marginal cost and making zero pro…t as a result. In the second case when market competition is relatively weak, namely when goods are either complements or highly di¤erentiated and the presence of Coops appears particularly valuable, by increasing output and welfare considerably. In this paper we have also shown that Coops a¤ect total welfare comparatively more under Cournot than under Bertrand competition. Therefore, according to our model, consumer cooperatives are likely to behave not too dissimilarly to traditional pro…t-maximizing …rms in all retail markets in which goods are highly (but not completely) homogeneous and competition occurs mostly in prices. As a reaction to these market forces, Coops may attempt to propose their customers genuinely di¤erentiated goods and, consequently, enhance consumers'welfare.
Some of the paper results call for further analysis. First of all, we have assumed throughout the paper a constant return of scale technology for …rms. Some of the recent literature on mixed oligopoly assumes decreasing returns of scale, thus implying increasing marginal costs. In this case a Coop, with its typical output expanding behaviour, could prove endogenously less e¢ cient than a PMF, thus imposing negative externality on the society. This e¤ect would be overturned if a Coop could be managed jointly by all consumers or by someone acting on their behalf. In this case consumers would no longer be atomistic and could play welfare-enhancing strategies, setting prices equal to marginal costs plus some distortive e¤ects arising from manipulating to their advantage the pricing of rival PMFs. Developing a model of consumer cooperatives governed by coalitions of consumers acting strategically may constitute a topic of great interest.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. For the …rst result, note that if = 1, conditions (3.3) and (3.4) imply the following best-replies (expressed as function of the other type of …rms'output only) (6.1)
, 8h 2 N nM:
Hence:
The economy total output is thus given by
The economy social welfare is de…ned as the sum of consumers'surplus and …rms'pro…ts, here equal to zero. Using (3.1) and (6.3) it becomes:
which is also the maximum welfare obtainable in the market for = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The …rst result can be easily checked by direct inspection of expressions (3.9) and (3.8). The second result can be proved by noting that, for all j 2 M and k 2 N ,
and expression (6.4) is always strictly positive for 2 [0; 1] and n 2. Finally, for all h 2 N nM
is equal to zero for = 0, since x k ( = 0) = x h ( = 0) = ( c) =2, while for = 1,
Finally, straightforward manipulations show that for 6 = 0
which is always satis…ed for 2 (0; 1).
.Proof of Proposition 3. By ispection of (3.17), it can be observed that the welfare raised by a Coop is higher than the welfare raised by a PMF whenever
and then
which always holds for m n and 2 [1=(1 n); 1].
Proof of Proposition 4. Straightforward manipulations show that
(1 + (n 1)) (2 + (n 1)) 2 which is monotonically decreasing both in ; for n > 1; and in n; for 1 > (n), where (n) is a level of not too far from zero (the higher the number of …rms in the market, the closer to zero).
Proof of Proposition 5. By expressions (4.2), (4.6) and by Bertrand equilibrium property, when goods are homogeneous ( = 1) no di¤erence between mixed and pure oligopoly equilibrium prices occurs, since p k = p j = p h = c: When goods are independent ( = 0) all PMFs behave as monopolists under both pure and mixed oligopoly, with p h = p k = a + c 2 whereas, also in this case, Coops behave as a perfectly competitive …rm, setting p j = c. Moreover, for 2 (0; 1)
which is zero for m = 0 and monotonically increasing in the number of Coops, since
for n 1: As to the second group of results, note that, for = 0
and, for every j-th Coops,
and therefore x j (p ; = 0) > x h (p ; = 0) = x k (p; = 0) : Moreover, for = 1 in all types of oligopoly the same quantities are chosen with
When 2 (0; 1), a simple inspection of (4.3) and (4.7) shows that, for m 1,
Finally, for 2 (0; 1) see that 3) ) (1 + (n 1)) (2 + (n 3)) whose both numerator and denominator are strictly positive within the de…ned range of parameters.
Welfare under Cournot Competition
Under Cournot competition, the welfare raised in a mixed oligopoly can be expressed as P
which, by symmetry of all j-th Coop and all h-th PMF, can be written as
Plugging (3.8) and (3.9) into the above expression, mixed oligopoly welfare is obtained as
+ y :
For m = 0 (6.6) becomes
which is pure PMF oligopoly welfare. For m = n, (6.6) turns into
i.e., pure Coop oligopoly welfare.
Welfare under Bertrand Competition
By plugging (4.3) into
; we obtain pure PMF oligopoly welfare under price competition as T W P M F = 1 2 n ( c) 2 (1 + (n 2)) (3 + (n 4))
(1 + (n 1)) (2 + (n 3))
2

:
Under a pure Coop Bertrand oligopoly with n …rms we obtain (6.8) T W COOP = n ( c) x k (e p) 1 2 n (x k (e p)) 2 + n(n 1)x 2 k (e p) where x k (e p) denotes Coop quantity under a pure Coop Bertand equilibrium (e p = e p 1 ; e p 2 ; :::e p n ).
By plugging (4.8) for m = n into (6.8), we obtain
(1 + (n 1)) :
Moreover, by using (4.7) and (4. when m = 1 (mixed duopoly). Firstly it is worth noticing that both expressions (??) and (??) are not monotonic in . Moreover, welfare di¤erences between price and quantity competition are generally larger under pure PMF duopoly than under mixed duopoly. In both cases such a di¤erence is high when goods are complements. When goods are substitutes, in a pure PMF duopoly the welfare di¤erence between Bertand and Cournot increases with , and only when is close to one does it starts to decrease. Conversely, in a mixed duopoly such a di¤erence …rst increases and then decreases to eventually disappear for = 1. These qualitative results also hold for n > 2. 
